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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~{- 7~- 7f- 7~- ~':- 7~ ,,- -;~- ,,- I\ -,, 
rATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
; . ) Case No. 12253 
)HN CUNNINGHAM and 
) rnNIS PARKER, 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
-,;- I\ -"- -> -,, -,;: " -,, " -,\ -"- -,, i\ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
-,, 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants, John Cunningham and Dennis 
Lrker, appeal from a conviction of the unlawful 
.le of an hallucinogenic drug and the sentence 
tposed thereon in the Third Judicial District 
1urt, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
-,, 
i\ 
Appellants were tried on a charge of the un-
1wful sale of LSD, contrary to Utah Code Ann. 
58-33-6 (1) (1953) (Supp. 1969), before the 
1norable Joseph G. Jeppson, sitting without a 
Lry. Upon a verdict of guilty appellants were 
:ntenced on July 20, 1970, to a term of imprison-
-1-
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nt at the Utah State Prison; and appeal from the 
dgment and sentence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the judgment 
the lower court and dismissal of the action, 
in the alternative, reversal and remand for 
rther proceedings, with directions and instruc-
ons for modification and correction of the 
ntence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During late November, 1969, a well co-ordin-
~d team of undercover agents under the direct-
1 and control of Loni Deland, an employee of 
~ Utah Liquor Law Enforcement Division, chanced 
make the acquaintence of appellant Cunningham 
the apartment of one Mike Fellows. The team 
agents subsequently approached the appellants 
their apartment at 329 East Seventh South, 
Lt Lake City, and asked if appellants could 
>ply them with a quant:ity of LSD. On several 
:asions the response was negative. (R. 77-80) 
On the evening of December 3, 1969, the 
'ee agents again arrived at appellant's apart-
tt sometime after 10: 00 p. m.; and .'!ft er gaining 
-2-
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~ntry into the apartment, presented the appel-
_ants with a variety of pretenses as to why the 
1gents had to have the illegal drug. After 
tbout thirty minutes of sp•) cadic conversation 
ind repcated frequent and insistent demands 
rom the agents that appellants supply them with 
SD, the appellants finally capitulated to the 
emands, and allegedly delivered over eight tab-
ets of the drug. The agents threw a $20 bill 
n the floor for payment. (R. 82-84) 
The appellants, 19-year old boys from a 
nall town in Idaho, had been in Salt Lake City 
nly a short time and testified that they were 
iving in a rough neighborhood and that they 
:quiesced in the transaction only because they 
~re becoming fearful of the agents and hoped 
1at if they gove the agents what they were ask-
1g for that they would go away and leave them 
Lone. ( R. 8 3, 9 2) The appellants further testi-
Led that they had been experimenting with LSD, 
iat they were not selling or dealing in drugs, 
~ that they were merely casual users and that 
te tablets in question were in their possession 
•lely for their own personal use. ( R. 90) 
-3-
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On December 5, 1969, appellants were arres-
~d and charged with the unlawful sale of an 
1llucinogenic drug to agent DeLand. They were 
·rested at gunpoint and their apartment w~s 
toroughly searched but no other drugs were 
, un d . ( R . 9 5 - 9 6 ) 
On the trial of the case the appellants 
ised the defense of entrapment based upon the 
nner and means used by the agents to finally 
f ect a purchase including the repeated and 
rsistent demands that appellants supply these 
ents with the drug. In spite of the entrap-
nt issue the trial Court found both defendants 
ilty as charged. (R. 105) 
Before sentencing, counsel for the appellants 
gued in favor of the Court's consideration of 
obation, but the trial judge, the Honorable 
seph G. Jeppson, automatically sentenced the 
pellants to imprisonment at the State Prison 
r the "indetermin~te term provided by law·" 
-4-
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ARGUMENT I 
APPELLANTS WERE DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL AND 
UE PROCESS OF LAW FOR THE REASON THAT THE TRIAL 
OURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAP-
ENT. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE WAS IN-
UFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER 
F LAW TO REBUT THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE. 
Entrapment has been defined as the inducement 
f one "to commit a crime not contemplated by him 
or the mere purpose of instituting a criminal 
rosecution against him. It has also been 
ef ined as the conce~'tion and planning of an 
ffense by an officer and the procurement of its 
)mmission by one who would not have perpetrated 
~ except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud 
f the officer. See Vol. 21 Am. Jur. 2d,§ 143 
rim. Law. and cases cited therein. 
The defense of entrapment most generally 
!cepted in the United States has its roots in 
ie ma.iority opinjori in Sorrells v. U'1itecl 
;ates, 257 U.S. J35 (1932), which held that en-
'apment is established: 
11 Wlien the criminal design originates with the 
officials of the government and they implant 
in the mind of an·~ innocent person the dispo-
sition to commit the alleged offens~ and in-
duce its commission in order that they may 
prosecute. 11 
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he controlling question is: 
"Whether the defendant is et person otherwise 
innocent whom the government is seeking to 
punish for an alleged offense which is the 
product of the creative activity of its own 
officials." 
lring the days of Prohibition Sorrells sold some 
iquor to a government agent who posed as a mem-
~r of Sorrells' World War I Army division. The 
liskey was forthcoming onl) afte1· several re-
1ests had been ma~~\; 
The Court in Sorrells adopted the so-called 
>rig in of intent" test, a subjective test that 
!quires determining whether the defendant or the 
1vernment agent conceived, planned, or caused 
1nunission of the crime. By allowing an inquiry 
1to the defendant's past criminal record or 
·ior suspicious conduct the requisite elements 
predisposition and criminal design may be 
termined; and the defense is valid if the de-
ndant lacked the prior intent to commit the 
ime charged. 
The rule and rationale of Sorrells was re-
f irmed in the case of Sherman v. United States, 
6 U.S. 369 (1958). In Sherman the factual 
sue was whether the informer had convinced an 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
>therwise unwilling person to commit a criminal 
let or whether petitioner was already predispo6 cd 
;o commit the act and exhibited only the natural 
tesitancy of one acquainted with the narcotics 
.rade . The Court found that a number of repiti-
. ions of a request to supply narcotics predicated 
1n the informer's presumed suffering had preceded 
Le defendant's final acquiescence to supply some 
:_rugs. The Court found that a single request 
·as not enough and that the informant made numer-
us requests in order to overcome first the de-
endant' s refusal and his evasiveness and finally 
is hesitancy in order to achieve capitulation. 
he Court found that the series of sales were not 
ndependent acts subsequent to the inducement but 
art of a course of conduct which was the product 
f the inducement. 
It appears that the defense of entrapment as 
t exists in the state of Utah, is quite similar 
o the rules set forth in Sorrells and Sherman, 
upra. In the case of State v. Pacheco, 15 Utah 
d 148, 369 P. 2d 494, it was stated: 
"For a peace officer to procure a person to 
commit a crime which he otherwise would not 
have committed for the purpose of apprehending 
-7-
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and prosecuting him is entrapment. This is 
so discordant to the true function of law 
enforcement, which is the prosecution, not 
the causation of crime; and so repugnant to 
fundamental concepts of justice that the con-
viction of an accused under such circumstan-
ces will not be approved. When that issue is 
present the question is whether the crime is 
the product of the defendant's own intention 
and desire or is the product of some entice-
ment or inducement by the peace officer. If 
the crime was in fact so instigated or induced 
by what the officer did that the latter's con-
duct w:c~s the generating cause which produced 
the crime and without which it would not have 
been committed, the defendant ohould not be 
convicted. On the other hand, if the defend-
ant 1 s attitude of mind was such that he de-
sired and intended to commit the crime, the 
mere fact that an officer or someone else 
afforded him an opportunity to commit it 
would not constitute an entrapment which 
would be a defense to its commission; and 
this would not be less true even though 
an undercover man went along with the def end-
ant in the criminal plan and aided or encour-
aged him in it." 
n the Pacheco case the defendant was convicted 
n the bci.sis of a burglary and grand larceny 
harge in which one of several individuals who 
erpet:r·ated the crime was, unbeknownst to the · 
efendant, a police officer who tipped off the 
)lice that the crime was about to occur, with 
-8-
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m undercover officer. Acting on a tip from this 
.nformant, the defendant and the others were 
tpprehended shortly after the burglary with an 
mount of money in his possession. Although 
hat persuasion which overcomes natural reluc-
ance on the part of innocent persons to commit 
crime which he is ~ot otherwise disposed to 
o is "entrapment," it is noted that the Court 
ust draw a line between entrapping innocent, 
nwary people who are not inclined to commit 
rime and entrapping the unwary criminal who 
till gets caught in his own schemes because of 
is misplaced confidence. 
This Court affirmed the Pacheco reasoning 
l the case of State v. Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 421, 
j2 P. 2d 50 (1967). In Perkins the defendant 
Lrst approached the agent inquiring whether he 
~sired to make further purchases of drugs. 
tere was some evidence that the undercover agent 
td made prior purchases of marijuana from the 
~fendant. The agent asked whether Perkins 
1uld get him a cap of heroin and Perkins quoted 
m a price; he left the bar shortly thereafter 
d attempted to purchase some drugs. The 
-0-
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defendant although unable to obtain heroin, re-
turned after a short time and sold the officer 
five joints of marijuana. On the trial of that 
~ase the entrapment issue was raised indirectly 
>n cross-examination and the defendant did not 
;ake the stand. The fact that there was sub-
;tantial evidence in the case of prior contacts 
1etween the defendant and the same agent involv-
ng other transactions was allowed to show a pre-
lisposition. 
This Court has had occasion to interpret and 
urther construe the the0ry of the entrapment 
efense in the re:'.ent decision of State v. Kasai, 
7 Utah 2d 326, 495 P. 2d 1265, wherein it was 
tated that: 
11 Entrapment is not established as a matter of 
law where there is any substantial evidence 
in the reco1·d from which it may be inf erred 
that the criminal intent to commit the partic-
ular offense originated in the mind of the 
accused. The f~ct that a government agent 
offers to buy narcotics from a suspect, thus 
giving him the opportunity to commit the 
offense, does not constitute entrapment·" 
The "origin-of-intent" test, being subjective, 
ls been recently the subject of some criticism· 
10-
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:ee ULR Vol. 1971, Swnmer, No. 2, @ p. 266, and 
:ases cited therein. It would appear that the 
rend is toward the position set out in the con-
urring opinions of Sorrells and Sherman, that 
he determination of entrapment as a matter of 
aw requires the objective examination of the 
olice conduct. In Sherman the concurring jud-
es were of the opinion that the Court reversed 
he conviction because of the conduct of the 
nf ormer, and not because the government failed 
o draw a convincing picture of the past crimi-
al conduct, even though the majority found no 
intent. 11 
It could be contended in the instant case, 
s it was in Sherman and Kasai, that the entrap-
ent is no defense on the theory that the offi-
ers "merely afforded an opportunity" to one 
predisposed" to sell. A careful comparison of 
he facts in the case reveals that Kasai may be 
eadily distinguished. 
In Kasai, an old acquaintance and former drug 
ddict, acting as a police informant, approached 
he defendant, who was changing a tire on his 
~r, anct requested marijuana. The informer 
2lped the defendant change the tire and then 
-11-
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>oth went into the house where the defendant pro-
luced a "lid." A f cw minutes later the informant 
eft the house and turned the evidence over to 
raiting police. There was other evidence admit-
ed at the trial of that case tending to estab-
ish that there had been at least one prior 
ale to the same informant, and that no unusual 
ersuasion was apparently involved. 
There is no evidence in the case at bar 
hich proves beyond a reasonable doubt the state 
f mind or predisposition which 11 readily res-
onds11 to the 11 opportunity" created by the offi-
ers. On the contrary, it is clear that the 
olice conduct was the generating cause which 
roduced the crime, and without which it would 
Dt have been committed. 
Appellants respectfully submit that the test 
ecently adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in 
1e case of State v. Reichenberger, 209 Kan. 
LO, 405 P. 2d 919, should be applied here. The 
insas Court, after carefully discussing the 
Lstorical developments in this area of the law, 
lted that where the events culminating in a 
'iminal offense commence with a police solici-
-12-
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ation, the defense of entrapment will almost 
lways present a question of fact. When there 
s no proof of conduct on the part of the 
efendants prior to the police solicitation, only 
n "uncensurable solicitation" met by 11 ready 
ompliance" may be some evidence of predisposi-
ion. 
The further test of predi-position then formu-
~ted is whe~her the type of police persuasion 
sed creates a "substantial risk 11 that such 
ff enses will be committed by persons other than 
1ose who are ready to commit them. This f ormu-
1tion was also suggested in the Model Penal Code 
~oposed Official Draft, § 2.13 (1962). 
The instant case clearly is one of police 
>licitation involving a substantial risk of 
tducing innocent persons to commit a crime 
tich they otherwise would not have attempted. 
tere can be little doubt but that the trans-
tion was brought about through a persistent, 
·rceful, and insistent series of demands by 
e officers that appellants pro~uce drugs for 
em. The fact that appellants had only a few 
blets in their possession is entirely consis-
-13-
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ent with their explanation that they were, at 
ost, mere users, and that the only motivation 
o 11 sell11 was due to the fear induced by the 
gents. The Reichenberger case indicates that 
nusual or persistent inducements by policP may 
e sufficient to raise an entrapment defense 
equiring acquittal. 
In conclusion, appellants submit that in 
his case a public law enforcement official along 
ith persons acting in co-operation with that 
ff icial perpetrated an entrapment solely for 
he purpose of obtaining evidence of a commission 
f an offense by soliciting and encouraging ano-
her person to engage in conduct constituting 
hat offense by employing rn.ethods of persuasion 
r inducement of the type which create a substan-
ial risk that such an offense will be committed 
y persons other than those who are ready to 
ommit it. The case should be reversed. 
-1~-
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ARGUMENT II 
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT CASE ·' THE SENTENCE IMPOSED CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF 
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AND 
VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, DUE TO THE EXIST-
ENCE OF SEPARATE STATUTES WHICH PROVIDE DIFFER-
ENT PUNISHMENTS FOR IDENTICAL CONDUCT; AND SINCE 
THERE IS DOUBT OR UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHICH OF 
SEVERAL PUNISHMENTS IS APPLICABLE, APPELLANTS 
ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE LESSER. 
Appellants were found guilty of the unlawful 
sale of LSD and were sentenced to imprisonment 
at the Utah State Prison. The orders of comJ11it-
ment (R. 12, 14) issued pursuant to the sentence 
read as follows: 
"The .i udgment and sentence of this Court is 
that you,[John Cunningham and Dennis Parker] 
be confined and imprisoned in the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term as provided 
by law for the crime of unlawfully selling 
an hallucinogenic drug as charged." 
Appellants were charged with violation of 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-3~-6 (1) (19.)3. 1969 supp.) 
which provides: 
11 It shall be unJ awful for any person to 
manufacture, compound, process, poss~ss, 
have under his control, sell, prescribe, 
administer, dispense, use or compound any 
-15-
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depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic or 
other drug as defined herein except this 
prohi~ition shall not ap~ly to the following 
persons whose activities in connection wi~h 
such drug are as specified in this eubsection:" 
..... This statute then proceeds to exempt manu-
f acturer.c:, compounders, processors, pharm•-•cies, 
hospitals, research and educational institutions~ 
wholesale druggists, public health agencies and 
licensed physicians and non-drug uses of peyo~e 
by Indian members of the Native American Church 
from the provisions of the drug abuse control law. 
Utah Code Ann., § 58-33-6 (e) (1953, 1969 
supp. ) provides:· 
"Whenever the possession, sale, transfer or 
dispensing of any drug or substance would con-
stitute an offense under this act and also 
constitutes an offense under the laws of this 
state relating to the possession, sale, trans-
fer or dispensing of drugs or marijuana, such 
offense shall not be punishable under this 
act but shall be punishable under the other 
provisions of law." 
This Court has recently made it perfectly 
clear that the well-established rule is: 
"That a statute creating a crime should be 
sufficiently certain that persons of ordinary 
intelligence who desire to obey the law may 
-16-
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know how to conduct themselves in conformity 
with it. The fair and logical concomitant 
of that rule is that such a penal statute 
should be similarly clear, specific and 
understandable as to the penalty imposed for 
its violation. 11 
State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P. 2d 146 
(1969). 
The Shondel case involved the determination 
of the pruper penalty for possession of LSD. 
One statute, Utah Code Ann., § 58-33, made the 
offense a misdemeanor while § 58-13a made the 
identical conduct a felony. The language of 
th~s Court in construing a provision of 
g )8-13a-~4 (.i-), containing language identical 
to that of ~ 58-33-6 (e), is as follows: 
"This reference to 'such other provisions 
of the law' leaves one concerned with com-
pliance with the law to search elsewhere to 
discover whether 'some other provision of 
the law' dealing with narcotic drugs or 
marijuana prescribe some other penalty for 
the possession of LSD." 
rhe equal protection of the law requires that the 
_aws affect alike all persons similarly situated. 
~he conflicting statutes were resolved so that 
)hondel was entitled to the lesser penalty. 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In a similar case, State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 
'I 4)··6 P. j-,) 2d 168 (1969), this ~ourt ~gain ruled 
:hat an accused is entitled to the benefit of 
~he lesser penalty where the laws provide two dif-
'erent penalties for the same conduct. The case 
_nvol ved a conviction for uttering a forged pre-
;cription, a felony under 5 8-1 Ja- -~4, but a mis-
le1r.eanor under 58-17-14.13. Applying the Shondel 
'ule, the case was remanded for resentencing as 
l misdemeanor under 58-17-1..1 .13. 
Appellants herein submit that the rules laid 
~wn by this Court in Shondel and Fair are con-
;rolling in the instant case. Utah Code Ann., 
iS-17-1..J. .11 provides, in pertinent part: 
"Any proprietor of a pharmacy or other per-
son who shall sell, dispose of, or permit 
the sale or disposition of any drug intended 
for use by man ..... unless i~. is dispensed 
upon a prescription of a doctor ..... is 
guilty of an offense. 11 (emphasis added) 
'he conduct which constitutes a violation of 
58-33-6 -(1) and 58-17-14.11 is identical. The 
enalty for a violation of 58-17-14.11 is found 
n g 58-17-26, and provides that a violation of 
hat section is a misdemeanor. Appellants sub-
it that the case at bar should therefore be 
·ernanded for proper sentencing· 
-18-
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While it is true that the drug LSD is not as 
commonly used as stimulant drugs which are exten-
sively prescribed primarily for relief of de-
pression and for weight control or the nrnnerous 
depressant drugs which are P'-~escribed in great 
numbers as tranquilizers, the use of LSD in 
treating chronic alcoholism as well as for the 
'1 •'atment of some cancer patients is quite well 
documented. The positive uses of this drug by 
licensed medical practitioners is growing. The 
trial judge seemed to be of the opinion that LSD 
was simply not the type of drug which is includ-
ed within the meaning of 58-17-1~.ll, but neither 
statute :~_istinguishes the depressant or stimulant 
from the hallucinogenic with respect to penalty. 
The statute tmder which appellants were con-
victed and apparently sentenced has since been 
repealed by the Utah Legislature effective Janu-
ary 1, 1972, Utah Code Ann.,g 58-37. The penalty 
provided in the new statute for the unlawful 
sale of controlled substances,including LSD, is 
a maximum of ten years, § 58-37-8 (b) (ii)· 
There is no minimum mandatory provision and the 
statute clearly indicates a policy of pref erring 
-19-
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~abilitation by probation and treatment for 
0 ung first offenders. Where the legislature 
hanges the law favorable to an accused,under 
ertain circumstances the accused is entitled to 
he favorable change in the law. See State v. 
~, 2 6 Utah 2 d 3 9 2 , 4 9 0 P • 2 d 3 3 4 , and cases 
ited therein. 
Appellants submit that the Court in the case 
t bar should also apply the principles set forth 
n Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230, 479 P. 2d 791 
l970), on reh. 25 Utah 2d 380, 483 P. 2d 425. 
1e f.egislatur8 has expressed an intent to lessen 
.1e penalty, and modern and advanced princip.l•~s 
f jurisprudence should try and give effect to 
he 1 esser sentence. 
A careful reading of the orders of commitment 
md sheriff's receipts (R. 12, 13, 14, 15) re-
'eals that the Court provided the sentence "as 
>rovided by law" for the offense 11 as charged. 11 
lowhere does the Court specifically set forth 
~ich of several possible penalties within 
I SS-33 were being applied. The record shows 
;hat defense counsel, the Court, and the prose-
:ut i ng attorney believed, throughout the trial' 
-20-
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that the maximum penalty was five years (R. 26). 
The actual determination of the term of imprison-
ment was made, not by the Court, but by the State 
Prison I. D. Officer, one James W. Johnson (R. 12, 
13, 14, 15). The term of five years to life is 
not set forth specifically in any oth~r part of 
the record. 
The only apparent source of this penalty is 
found in § 58-3 3-4--( 3) which states in part: 
"Every person who transports, imports into 
this state, sells, furnishes, administers, 
or gives away or offers to [do the same] 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison from five years to life and 
shall not be eligible for release upon com-
pletion of sentence or on parole or on any 
other basis until he has served not less 
than three ye•lrs." 
But it is provided in Utah Code Ann., ~ 58-33-
4 ( 6), that: 
"Any person violating any other provisions 
of this Chapter, except those mentioned in 
the preceding four paragraphs, ..... shall 
be punished for the first offense •.... for 
not more than five years ..... " 
And since appellants were charged with violating 
11 other provisions" of the Chapter, it seems 
clear that the penalty of no more than five years 
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must also be applied if any part of § 58-33 even 
applies. Appellants were charged only with a 
violation of 58-33-6 (1), which nowhere indicates 
a five year to life penalty. Clearly, then, 
there exists doubt and uncertainty as between 
several different statutes and p~nalties. 
The Court automatically imposed a sentence of 
imprisonment. There is nothing to indicate why 
tKo young first offenders who were entrapped into 
delivering eight tablets of LSD to a team of nar-
cotics agents were denied probation. The report 
prepared by the Adult Probation and Parole Depart-
ment recommended probation. The·ce is nothing in 
their backgrounds to indicate that they are not 
good probation material. A five to life term, 
if upheld by this Court, would violate the Con-
stitutional guarantees of equal protection of 
the law and the prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishments. There is no rational justification 
for the illegal five to life sentence and no dis-
tinction can be made between these appellants and 
the thousands of other young people with similar 
character and backgrounds, who are routinely 
placed on probation in this jurisdiction for 
similar offenses. 
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This Court, in State v. Barlow, 25 Utah 2d 
375, 483 P. 2d 236, held that a minimum manda-
tory provision of law does not preclude the 
Court from placing a person on probation pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann.) § 77-35-17 (1953) where it 
appears compatible with the public interest. 
In the case of Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 
(1958), the Supreme Court of the United States 
in a majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren 
stated: 
11 The basic purpose underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity 
of man. While the state has the power to 
punish the Amendment stands to insure that 
this power be exercised within the limits of 
civilized standards. Fine, imprisonment and 
even execution may be imposed depending upon 
the enormity of the crime ..... the Amend-
ment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that make the progress 
of a maturing society. 11 
On the basis of the Eighth Amendment, and 
applying the rules of Shondel and £..!!.!:, appellants 
respectfully submit that in the event that the 
conviction itself be upheld that the case be 
remanded for imposition of the proper sentence, 
a misdemeanor, with recommendation for probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully contended from the fore-
~oing arguments that appellants 1 convictions 
~ould be reversed and the sentence set aside. 
~lternati vely, the case should be remanded for 
~esentencing as a misdemeanor, with recommenda-
tion for probation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN D. RUSSELL 
Attorney for Defendants-
Appellants 
252 Canyon Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84103 
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